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1II.
CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION.
Recently market economies have undergone various types of merger waves, and
welfare effects of these mergers have been widely investigated in the industrial
organization literature (Schroeter, 1988; Azzam and Schroeter, 1995; Azzam, 1997;
Sexton, 2000; Paul, 2001; Lopez et al., 2002). Horizontal mergers can restrict their
outputs and increase their prices and profits through their increased concentration. The
increased output price is expected to result in the welfare loss to consumers. However,
the merged firms can also improve production and marketing efficiencies through scale
economies, and as a result, a part of the welfare loss can be offset by the improved
efficiencies of merged firms (Dockner and Gaunersdorfer, 2002).
Controversy related to the size of welfare losses associated with market power has
persisted since Arnold Harberger (1954) first produced estimates of welfare loss in U.S.
manufacturing industries due to the horizontal merger (Dickson and Yu (1989).
According to Sexton and Lavorie (2001), in highly concentrated industries, a positive
(negative) correlation between concentration and selling (purchasing) price exists. This
correlation has been found rather consistently across many studies of food-processor
oligopoly and oligopsony power and food-retailer oligopoly power. The U.S. beef-
packing industry is one of those which have undergone maximum level of food
2manufacturer and retailer concentration. There was an escalation of the four-firm
concentration ratio (CR4) from 30% in 1978 to 86% in 1994 in the beef packing industry.
Azzam and Schroeter (1995) states that within the past two decades, beef packing in the
U.S. has experienced a trend toward fewer and larger plants, increased consolidation
among larger firms, and heightened concentration. Previous studies by Muth (1996),
who analyzed oligopoly power and Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), who analyzed
oligopsony power, failed to find any evidence of market power. Azzam (1997) and
Morrison Paul (1999, 2000) argued that market power played a very minor role and cost
economies and technological change are the important factors driving the beef-packing
sector. These previous studies indicate that the potential economy-wide welfare loss
depends on four parameters: the price elasticity of demand, the elasticity of marginal
cost, seller concentration and the conjectural variation elasticity. Conjectural variation
elasticity is a measure of cooperation among firms within an industry. Salant and Shaffer
(1983) examined the profitability of mergers in a Cournot model and concluded that
mergers were unprofitable unless they involved at least eighty percent of the firms in the
industry. Deneckere and Davidson (1983) extended Salant and Shaffer (1983) by
showing that when firms produce differentiated products and compete for prices instead
of quantities, a merger becomes profitable. Azzam and Schroeter (1995) also extended
Salant et al. (1983) estimating welfare impacts of mergers in the beef packing industry on
consumers, producers, and eventually total economy. The authors investigated cost
reductions necessary to neutralize consumer and producer surplus losses under alternative
assumptions about supply and demand conditions, and post consolidation structure and
conduct. They concluded that the estimated cost savings necessary to neutralize the
3anticompetitive effects of consolidation in the beef-packing industry were about half of
the actual cost savings from scale economies. Azzam (1997) analyzed the farm
wholesale price spread for beef and concluded that the positive efficiency impacts from
consolidation dominated a small negative impact due to oligopsony power. However
most previous empirical studies of imperfectly competitive markets on beef-packing
industry have assumed that all firms within the industry supply a homogeneous product
and use quantity as a strategic variable thus primarily giving importance to Cournot
conjecture. In this case, there is only one demand function and one common price
generated in the market. However, most imperfectly competitive industries are
characterized by multiple differentiated products that compete with each other based on
price as the strategic variable rather than quantity. Hence, a separate market demand
function and unique price exist for each quality, and the brands are incomplete substitutes
for each other. In such cases, a product-differentiated oligopoly model with price as the
strategic variable, or a generalized Bertrand model is applicable.
A comparison of the two benchmark models of price and quantity competition has
been undertaken in the literature. Hathaway and Rickard (1979) examined a duopoly
market with general demand and cost functions. They found that at least one firm’s price
is higher in Cournot equilibrium than in Bertrand equilibrium under duopoly. Singh and
Vives (1984) further showed that in a duopoly situation, both firms’ prices are higher and
outputs are lower in quantity competition than in price competition. The studies
conducted concerning the comparison of welfare between price and quantity competition
is predominantly analytical and not supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, most
previous studies have used annual data with few observations. These types of data have
4the potential to cause convergence problems during model estimation and/or mask
seasonal variations in prices and quantities. These limitations may have dictated the
results in previous studies.
The motivation of this study was to conduct a market power - cost efficiency
effect analysis for price competition as well, compare the effects with quantity
competition and check whether the results from previous studies on quantity competition
that market power effect is superseded by cost efficiency effect is reversed under
alternative assumptions of market structure. Singh and Vives (1984) suggested that price
competition is welfare enhancing compared to quantity competition. We went on to
examine whether this actually holds good for the beef packing industry. Moreover, a
similar kind of analysis was conducted for input price as the effect of processor’s
increased concentration on the price which the farmers actually receive for their inputs is
worth analyzing.
Our objective is to compare effects of horizontal mergers in the U.S. beef packing
industry under quantity and price competitions. Our study develops separate models for
price and quantity competitions that include a measure of industrial concentration,
namely Herfindahl index. Azzam and Schroeter, (1995), Azzam (1997), and Lopez,
Azzam, and Liron-Espana (2002); derived a Cournot type model for homogeneous
product and estimated market power and cost efficiency effects of industry concentration
on output prices. We extend these earlier studies by considering a model with
differentiated products and deriving the market power and cost efficiency effects of
industry concentration on output as well as input prices for both Cournot and Bertrand
conjectures. We focus on the concentration in the oligopsonistic or buying side of the
5processors since the food processing industry is more likely to fit the oligopsonistic
profile, given the geographic nature of their input markets. The raw-materials are
supplied by numerous price-taking producers and given the difficulties in transportation
due to their bulk nature and perishability, each producer is likely to face only a small
number of processing firms as prospective buyers. We apply this model to weekly data
for U.S. beef packing industry. This enabled us to empirically investigate the comparison
of welfare loss due to market power under quantity and price competition. We further
extend our work by calculating the welfare loss to individual participants such as farmers,
consumers and processors for both types of model.
The conceptual framework is presented in Chapter II. In this chapter we present
the market power and cost efficiency effect analysis on the output price for both the
models under the assumption of homogeneous product and differentiated product. For
the differentiated product case we extend our analysis to the effects of consolidation on
the input price as well. Empirical framework and data sources are presented in Chapter
III. Chapter IV presents findings of the study and an interpretation. Chapter V
encompasses a welfare analysis of each participant under price competition and quantity
competition. Chapter VI provides a brief summary, conclusions, recommendations, and
limitations of the study, and suggestions for future researches.
6III.
CHAPTER II.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.
Theoretical Model for Homogeneous Products.
We consider a food processing industry involving the combination of a single raw
material input with other inputs into a competitively-sold processed good for our basic
theoretical framework.
Following Dickson and Yu (1989), we assume the processor demand and raw
material input supply functions take the constant elasticity forms
(1) ,0<= ,A/PQ d
where dQ , A, P and  stand for output demanded, a demand shifter, price and the
negative of price elasticity of industry demand
and
(2) ,BWQ s = 0> ,
where sQ , B, W and  represent quantity produced, a cost shifter, raw material input
price and the marginal cost elasticity. For numerical convenience competitive price and
raw material input price are set at $1 per unit and output is set at 100 units. Thus from
equations (1) and (2) the demand shifter A and cost shifter B are set at 100.
7Oligopoly output Q0, will be less than competitive output, 100 units, implying that
there might be a welfare loss under competition. To evaluate this oligopoly output we
first evaluate oligopoly price P0 using the following expression for the Lerner Index (L)
from Clarke and Davies (1982).
(3) L =

H)(1H
P
)MC(P
0
00 +=

.
Where MC0 is the industry marginal cost at Q0; H is the Herfindahl Index of seller
concentration; and  is the conjectural variation elasticity. Here, measures the
proportional change in the output (for Cournot) and price (for Bertrand) of rivals
expected by a typical firm in response to a proportional change in its own output (for
Cournot) or price (for Bertrand). According to Brander and Zhang (1990) for Cournot,
Bertrand and monopoly equilibrium, conjectural variation is equal to 0, -1, and 1
respectively for homogenous product. The Bertrand model requires, in the homogeneous
product case, that price equals marginal cost which is equivalent to the competitive case.
The Cournot competition implies that under the assumption of constant market share, if
any one firm decides to increase its output by one unit it does so under the assumption
that its competitors won’t change their output. Under price competition, the industry
output is fixed when any one participant decides to decrease its charged price by one unit;
it assumes that its competitors will increase their charged price by one unit as well. This
is so because once a competitor decides to lower his price his motive is to increase his
market share, if his conjecture is not as stated above, then the constant industry output
assumption fails to hold. Substituting MC0 =
1/
0
100
Q
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0
1/
0
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0 +=

and therefore
(4)
H)](1[H
1/Q1/(1/100)
P 00 +
= .
Substituting for 0P using equation (4) in the market demand curve we get,1
(5) .
)/(
0 
H)(1H1100Q
+





 +
=
The conjectural variation elasticity will be zero for the Bertrand competition or
the Perfectly Competitive case and will lie anywhere within zero and one for Cournot
competition (Sexton, 2000).
Differentiating equation (4) w.r.t. H we find the price effect on the output price to be
( )
[ ]2
0
H)](1[H
11/0Q
1/(1/100)
H
P
+

=


.
Under Price competition for homogeneous products, the conjectural variation elasticity is
zero, which yields that for Bertrand conjecture, 
1/
0Q
1/(1/100)
H
P0 =


.
Whereas for
quantity competition, the conjectural variation elasticity lies between zero and one, which
yields greater price effect as the resulting expression is likely to have a bigger numerator
and a smaller denominator.
9The Model for Differentiated Products.
In this section we develop two separate differentiated product models for price
competition and quantity competition. Most imperfectly competitive industries are
characterized by multiple differentiated products that compete with each other based on
price as the strategic variable rather than quantity. Hence, a separate market demand
function and unique price exist for each brand, and the brands are incomplete substitutes
for each other. In such cases, a product-differentiated oligopoly model with price as the
strategic variable, or a generalized Bertrand model is applicable. Infact a differentiated
product model is more applicable for the U.S. beef packing industry.
We consider an industry where there are a few processors each selling a
differentiated quality but buys more than one type of raw input to produce this
differentiated product. We assume that there are J processors and six raw input
alternatives in the industry. Each processor has access to the available set of raw inputs.
Although every processor has access to all the raw inputs, they do not necessarily
purchase all of them. They purchase only a few from the given set. Moreover, we
consider fixed proportions technology, thus the quantity of final output produced by the
processor equals the sum of the quantity of inputs he purchases from the farmers
i.e. = if qQ . Even though we can model both selling and the procurement markets,
our focus lies on the buying side and we consider that there exists imperfect competition
in the processor’s procurement market.
Let  represent the set of raw inputs associated with a certain segment of the beef
industry. There are F firms, each buying some subset f, of this segment. Let -f be the
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subset of raw inputs not associated with firm f. Therefore, = f  -f2 . We assume
that there are 6 raw inputs in . The profit of firm f is:
(6) { } fi
6
i
iiffffff cq)(qp(p(q))Q(p(q))}(Qmc(p(q)){QPmax = 

,
where fP is the price of brand f, fmc is the marginal cost of brand f, fQ is the output of
f-th processor, iq is the demand as well as farm supply at the equilibrium of i-th input,
ip is the farm price of ith input, and
fc are fixed costs of production. The demand for
brand f depend on own price, the price of other brands in the industry, and price of farm
inputs purchased: fQ = fQ ( )P,.....,P J1 . In maximizing the profit, the firms
simultaneously choose the prices they are willing to pay for the raw inputs required to
produce their brands and the average price reactions of other processors who buy the raw
inputs not part of their portfolio: ),(
fff ikj pphp  = , where h is an unknown
function. This is followed by the derivation of pricing equations for price competition
and quantity competition.
Case I: Price Competition.
Analysis of the effects of price competition on output price (retail price).
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to Pf leads to:
(7) 0.
P
P
.
P
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P
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Dividing equation (7) throughout by 
=
J
1f
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arising from the oligopsony power of processors into equation (8) we get,
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Multiplying equation (9) throughout by fP results in,
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Using the expression ,Hs 2f = Herfindahl index and after some manipulation of
equation (10) yields,
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Replacing the marginal cost for the Leontief cost function3,
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where fQ is the f-th processor’s output, v a price vector of non-farm inputs such as labor
and capital, and lm" , and l# are parameters to be estimated.
Differentiating equation (12) w.r.t H yields,
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Analysis of the effects of price competition on input price (farm price).
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to pi leads to:
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We assume for simplicity that the farmers operate in a competitive market.
Let
f
i
i
f
Q
p
p
Q


=
f
ii , be the price elasticity of demand in terms of input price,
i
i
i
i
q
p
p
q


=
f
ii , be the own price elasticity of supply, ..
i
k
k
i
q
p
p
q


=
f
ik , be the cross price elasticity
of supply,
k
i
i
k
p
p
p
p
.


=
f
ki! , be the processor’s conjectural variation elasticity.
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Differentiating the above equation w.r.t. H yields,
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= is the cost efficiency effect on input price.
We had assumed a fixed proportions technology, so the price elasticity of demand and
price elasticity of supply in terms of output price and input price are assumed to be same.
Case II: Quantity Competition.
Analysis of the effects of quantity competition on output price (retail price).
We maximize the following profit function in order to find the profit maximizing
quantity and price under quantity competition,
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The first order condition of firm f is:
Differentiating equation (15) w.r.t. Qf we get,
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oligopsony power of processors into equation (17) we get,
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Using the expression ,2 = Hs f Herfindahl Index and after some manipulation of
equation (18) results in,
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Differentiating equation (19) w.r.t H and substituting expression for marginal cost
for Leontief Cost function yields,
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Here the market power effect is given by C
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Analysis of the effects of quantity competition on input price (farm price)
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to qi leads to:
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Differentiating the above equation w.r.t. H we get,
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is the cost efficiency effect on input price.
We had assumed a fixed proportions technology, so the price elasticity of demand and
price elasticity of supply in terms of output price and input price are assumed to be same
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Comparison of market power and cost-efficiency effect under Price
competition and Quantity competition on output price.
Here we subtract the expressions for cost efficiency effect on output price for the two
models,
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Here, we can see that the expressions for cost efficiency effect on output price
under price competition and quantity competition is positive and same.
Now we shall check the market power effect,
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The own price elasticity of demand will necessarily negative and the own supply
elasticity is positive. However, it is somewhat difficult to assign signs to the cross price
elasticity of supply. We shall consider all three cases where ik might be positive,
negative, or equal to zero.
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Case a: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are positive, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
In such a situation, BMP is positive and CMP is negative. Thus when the cross price
elasticity of input supply is positive, market power effect on output price is greater under
price competition compared to quantity competition.
Case b: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are equal to zero, ,ki! and ki% are
both positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is
positive. In such a situation, BMP is positive, and CMP is negative. Thus when the
cross price elasticity of input supply is equal to zero, market power effect on output price
is greater under price competition compared to quantity competition.
Case c: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are negative, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
In such a situation, both BMP and CMP can be positive, negative or equal to zero. Thus
when the cross price elasticity of input supply is positive, it is not possible to conclude
whether market power effect is greater under price competition or quantity competition.
Only under this case can market power effect for price competition be greater than
quantity competition.
The cost efficiency effect for both the types of competition is positive in cases a,
and b. Since the market power effect for price competition is also positive, we can say
that the price effect of increased concentration under price competition can be positive or
negative. Whereas the market power effect for quantity competition is negative, we can
say that the price effect of increased concentration under quantity competition is
21
negative. Hence, the effect of increased concentration on output price is negative for
quantity competition. Thus we might conclude that increased concentration leads to a fall
in output price under quantity competition whereas a rise in output price under price
competition. However, it is ambiguous whose price effect is higher under conditions
applying to case c.
Comparison of market power and cost-efficiency effect under Price
competition and Quantity competition on input price.
Here we subtract the expressions for cost efficiency effect on input price for the
two models,
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Here, unlike the case of output price case we can see that the expressions for cost
efficiency effect under price competition and quantity competition is not same. In the
analysis for effect of increased concentration on input price two cases will arise.
Case d: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are positive, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
In such a situation, both BCE and CCE are positive. Thus when the cross price elasticity
of input supply is positive, it is ambiguous to conclude whose cost efficiency is greater.
Case e: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are negative, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
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In such a situation, BCE is positive and CCE are negative. Thus when the cross price
elasticity of input supply is positive, we can conclude that the cost efficiency effect under
price competition is higher as compared to quantity competition.
Now we shall check the market power effect,
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Case f: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are positive, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
In such a situation, both BMP and CMP are negative. Thus when the cross price
elasticity of input supply is positive, it is ambiguous to conclude whose market power is
greater.
Case g: Let us consider that kiikkiik and %!  are negative, ,ki! and ki% are both
positive under imperfect competition, ii has been assumed negative, and ii is positive.
In such a situation, BMP is positive and CMP is negative. Thus when the cross price
elasticity of input supply is positive, we can conclude that BMP is greater than CMP .
Hence when kiikkiik and %!  are positive, the price effect for both the
models can be positive, negative or equal to zero, hence we conclude that under such a
situation, the effect on the input price received by farmers in the post consolidation
scenario is ambiguous. Thus it becomes difficult to even predict whose price effect will
be higher. When kiikkiik and %!  are negative, the price effect under price
competition can be positive, negative or equal to zero. Thus there is a possibility that
23
there is a raise in the input price received by farmers. However, the price effect under
quantity competition will be negative implying that there is surely a fall in welfare in the
post-consolidation scenario for the farmers under quantity competition.
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IV.
CHAPTER III
DATA AND EMPIRICAL SETUP
The empirical application uses weekly data for the U.S. beef industry ranging from 1990
to 2006 for seven markets namely, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Iowa,
and Minnesota. The six different qualities chosen are over 80% choice steers, 65-80%
choice steers, 35-65% choice steers, over 80% choice heifers, 65-80% choice heifers, 35-
65% choice heifers. This data was taken from Livestock Marketing Information Centre
(LMIC, 2006). Annual data for input prices and quantities for the U.S. beef
manufacturing (SIC 2011) are from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
database (Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray, 2000). The input prices are represented by the
NBER’s price indices. Wage per work-hour is computed by dividing NBER’s total
payroll by the total number of production work-hours in the industry. Consumer price
index and producer price index for farm output are also from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).
The Herfindahl index for the U.S. beef processing industry is the steer and heifer
slaughter concentration index compiled from several annual reports from the Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA). Annual data are used for
population, cattle inventory, Herfindahl index, personal disposable income, and price and
quantity of labor, and capital.
25
To apply analytical results empirically, it is necessary to specify farm-input supply and
retail-output demand functions. Farm-input supply and retail-output demand functions
are represented by:
(23) )/()/()/()/(ln
,210 PPIpPPIpPPIpaPPIpaaQ f ikkikfiiidieselcorn  ++++=  ,
and
(24) ),/()/()/()/(ln 3210 CPIpCPIpCPIICPIpQ iiiturkeypork  ++++=
where CPI and PPI are consumer price index and producer price index for farm products,
respectively. Demand and supply schedules are specified in log-linear form to allow for
nonlinearities between prices and quantities. The base year for all prices is 1987.
Processors are expected to use non-farm inputs such as labor, and capital. Industry non-
farm input demand schedules are obtained by applying Shephard’s lemma on industry
processing cost function:
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where Xm is industry derived demand for the mth non-farm input purchased
competitively.
The two pricing equations used for empirical estimation were,
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The exogenous variables are price of diesel, price of corn, price of pork, price of labor,
price of capital, price of turkey, disposable income, and Herfindahl index for processors.
The endogenous variables are farm prices of the inputs, total demand for processed beef,
productivity of capital, and productivity of labor. The parameters estimated were ii , ii ,
ik , ki! , ki% , lm" , and l# .
A system of equations is estimated empirically using non-linear three stage least squares
(N3SLS) estimator for each case of imperfect competition discussed in the previous
section. Each system of equations includes equations for non-farm input demand for
labor, and capital– equation (25), cattle supply – equation (23), retail demand – equation
(24), and pricing equations. The instrumental variables required for N3SLS estimator
includes all exogenous variables, population and input prices (labor, capital, corn, calves,
and diesel). All systems of equations converged to a solution with a convergence
criterion of 0.001.
27
V.
CHAPTER IV. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS.
In our application of the market power and cost efficiency tradeoff model to the
beef packing industry, attention is limited to the steer and heifer sectors because of
its predominance in the industry as a whole and because of data considerations.
Parameter estimates from our two differentiated product models of imperfect competition
are reported in Tables 2, and 3. Most parameter estimates have the expected signs and
are significant at the one percent level.
Almost all "lm have positive values, suggesting that the processors cost function
is concave, and increasing in price. Own price elasticity for wholesale demand and farm
supply have the expected sizes and signs, and are significant at the one percent level of
statistical significance. The estimates of cross price supply elasticities were positive, and
negative depending on whether the inputs are bought by the same processor or not. The
inputs which are purchased by the same processor have negative cross price supply
elasticities as there might be a trade off between the demands for the two due to fixed
resources. However, the cross price elasticities between the inputs which the processor
purchases and which he did not purchase might be positive or zero. In all cases of
imperfect competition considered, conjectural variation estimates, ,% and ! are significant
at the 1% level.
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Direct estimates of market power and cost efficiency effects on output price from
an increase in concentration at processors’ level are obtained using equations (13) and
(21), and are reported in tables 4, and 5. The total price effect of an increase in
concentration at the processing level on retail price is measured as the sum of market
power effects and cost savings (from equations (13), and (21)).
The estimates of cost efficiency effects on output price were positive for all inputs
and almost same for both the models. This was in accordance to our analytical results.
Our analytical results suggest that the market power effect for an input would be positive
under price competition when the sum of the cross price elasticity of supply of that input
is positive and ambiguous in sign when the cross price supply elasticity is negative. The
estimates of market power effect as reported in table 5 show that this is true as for inputs
2 and 6 whose sum of cross supply elasticities is positive. However, we found that for
the other inputs as well it is positive except input 1. The net price effect on output price
is positive for all the inputs excepting inputs 1, 2, and 6 under price competition. In our
analytical framework we deduced that the market power effect of increase in
concentration on output price under quantity competition should be negative when the
sum of cross price supply elasticities is positive and for other situations it is ambiguous.
Our empirical estimates as reported in table 4 suggest similar results as the market power
effect is negative for inputs 2 and 6 under quantity competition. For all other inputs it is
positive excepting input 1. The net price effect on output price is positive for all the
inputs excepting inputs 1, 2, and 6. So for these cases our results converge with results of
previous studies which concluded that in the post-consolidation scenario, the cost
efficiency effect supersedes market power effect and is actually welfare enhancing for
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both consumers and processors. Thus unlike previous studies this result suggests that the
cost efficiency effect does not always supersede the market power effect of increased
concentration. Moreover, a trend was noticed which clearly suggest that the increase in
output price due to increase in concentration was higher under quantity competition as
compared to price competition.
Estimates of market power and cost efficiency effects on input price from an
increase in concentration at processors’ level are obtained using equations (14) and (22),
and are reported in table 6 and 7 for quantity competition and price competition
respectively. All estimates of market power and cost efficiency effects are significant at
the ten percent level of significance. The total effect of an increase in concentration at
the processing level on retail price is measured as the sum of market power effects and
cost savings (from equations (14), and (22)). In our analytical framework, we found that
the cost efficiency effect and market power effect are both positive under price
competition when the sum of cross price elasticity is negative. The empirical results as
reported by table 7 depict similar results. The net price effect is positive for inputs 1 and
6 suggesting an increase in price received by farmers has actually increased after
increased concentration. For all other inputs the price which the farmers receive has
declined. Thus for these cases there is no spillover of increased profit of the processors
in favor of the farmers. The market power effect and cost efficiency effect of increased
concentration on input price is negative under quantity competition. For all the inputs the
net price effect is negative under quantity competition suggesting that the welfare of
farmers decline in the post consolidation scenario. Thus we can conclude that increase in
concentration is welfare diminishing for farmers for all inputs under quantity competition
30
and welfare enhancing for a few inputs under price competition. However, even the
inputs for which the input price received by farmers decreased for both models, the extent
of decrease was higher under quantity competition than price competition.
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VI.
CHAPTER IV.
WELFARE ANALYSIS OF CONSUMERS, PROCESSORS AND FARMERS.
Before we compare the welfare effects of price competition and quantity
competition, we make certain assumptions following Azzam and Schroeter (1995). We
consider ,&APQd = to be the demand function for processed beef where & is the price
elasticity of demand, and let ,BWQs = be the supply function for farm input where 
is the price elasticity of farm supply. We consider V=
w
wcp 
where V is the
oligopsony distortion. Thus p=w (1+V) +c. Let the initial quantity be equal to Q0= 100,
w = 1, p= 1+V+c, and B= 100. For simplicity we assume an industry with homogeneous
product. When the market is perfectly competitive, the price paid for the raw material is
equal to the output price minus cost, thus the markup or distortion is zero. However,
when the market is imperfectly competitive, then V greater than zero. Substituting for A
and B in the demand and supply equations gives the inverse consumer demand function
(26).  /1/1100)1( QcVP ++= ,
and the inverse input supply function
(27)  /1/1100 Qw = .
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The demand curve for raw material input at a given quantity, net of marginal costs is
(28) cQcVw ++=   /1/1100)1( .
Figure 1 contains graphs of equations (26), (27), and (28). Consumer demand, raw
material input supply, and the raw material input derived demand curves are labeled D, S,
and DD, respectively.
At this point if we imagine that the marginal processing costs fall due to plant scale
economies. Further we imagine that the post-consolidation level of V is greater than
initial V. This drop is marginal cost will shift the raw material input derived demand
curve from DD to DD* in the figure where DD* is the derived demand for raw material at
the lower level of marginal cost.
We find the change in Consumer Surplus, Producer’s surplus, and processor’s
profit in the following section. We follow Figure 1 to derive the expressions for welfare
loss to consumers, processors and producers due to increase in concentration5. The
resulting post-consolidation quantity, raw material input price, and output price are
denoted in figure A as Q*, w*, and p*, respectively. Area abed represents change in
consumer surplus.
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Change in consumer surplus for quantity competition:
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The area mnpo is the change in producer surplus of raw inputs.
Change in farmer’s surplus under quantity competition:
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Change in farmer’s surplus under price competition:
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Processor’s pre-consolidation and post consolidation oligopoly rents are
represented by areas jknm and fgpo, respectively. Thus the change in their profit (fgpo-
jknm) is given by
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Following Azzam and Schroeter (1995) we use the expression for distortion

00 )1( 
=

=
H
w
wcpV where 0 is the conjectural variation elasticity. First,
estimates of pre-consolidation values of V and H were obtained using information
from outside sources. Then the estimate of supply elasticity was combined with the test
case values of 0 and H to determine the estimates of actual distortion. At the pre
consolidation level the value of 0 is set to zero. For simplicity, we use the baseline and
test case levels of distortion from Azzam and Schroeter’s paper. The baseline and test
case values of distortion have been taken as 0.0300, 0.0450, and 0.1136 and a simulation
was done to see the actual change in consumer, producer surplus and processor’s rent.
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We found that there was a welfare loss for both consumers and producers with increased
concentration. The extent of loss was slightly lower under price competition as compared
to quantity competition. However, processors profit was higher under quantity
competition compared to its counterpart. Thus, we can conclude that Price competition
leads to smaller levels of welfare loss to consumers and producers whereas Quantity
competition is more welfare enhancing for processors.
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VII.
Chapter V. 
CONCLUSIONS.
In our study we have modeled oligopsony power- cost efficiency tradeoffs in the
food processing industry for a differentiated products model. We applied this model to
the beef packing industry as this industry fits the oligopsony profile and it has
experienced unprecedented changes which are thought to have endangered cost efficiency
gains arising from plant economies, due to increased market power. This study estimated
the tradeoff between market power and cost efficiency from increase in industry
concentration in the beef packing industry on output as well as input price for both price
competition and quantity competition while allowing for imperfect competition at the
processing level. Previous studies on this kind of analysis of tradeoff have left out the
case of price competition and used assumptions about market structure supporting
quantity competition. Moreover, the earlier studies have not attempted to perform market
power-cost efficiency trade-off analysis for farmers. Earlier studies on the comparison of
welfare effects of price competition and quantity competition were primarily analytical
and were not supported by empirical evidence. Our study further analyses the welfare
effect on the various participants like consumers, farmers and processors.
In our analytical framework we were able to show when the effect on price (input
and output) and welfare effects under alternative assumptions of imperfect competition.
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The empirical results reported in this study suggest that, increase in concentration led to
effect on final good price when the sum of cross price elasticity of supply is positive for
both the models. For the inputs whose sum of cross price elasticity of supply is negative,
the net price effect is negative leading to the conclusion that for these inputs, the welfare
of consumers as well as processors is raised. However, the effect on input price is
somewhat different and increased concentration might lead to actually a fall in the price
of inputs which the farmers receive in most of the cases. Only under Bertrand
competition, there might be a possibility that the price received by farmers actually rise in
the post consolidation scenario. Infact, even when the price effect was positive, the
extent of increase in both output price and input price was lower under price competition
than under quantity competition. Our simulation results suggest that the loss in surplus
for consumers and producers were slightly less under price competition as compared to
quantity competition. However, the oligopsony rent was surely higher under quantity
competition than under price competition.
For our empirical analysis we estimated the two models separately thus we have
slightly different parameter estimates under the two models considered. This procedure
has certain limitations as the results might be influenced by the different parameter
estimates. For further research, a sensitivity analysis can be done by performing the same
analysis under different assumptions, e.g. we can use the parameter estimates of quantity
competition for both the models excepting the conjectural variation elasticity of price
elasticity; and again use the parameter estimates of price competition for both the models
excepting the conjectural variation elasticity of Cournot. With this kind of analysis we
40
can see whether our results in this study are biased due to the empirical procedure
adopted.
The results presented here have important policy implications. They suggest that
consolidations in the beef industry are not always efficiency driven. Infact in most cases
it has led to welfare loss of both consumers and farmers. Atleast for the input price,
generally there has been no spillover effect of profit earned by processors on farmers due
to increased concentration. However, the inclusion of oligopoly power of retailers
separately in the same model might lead to different results.
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IX.
Endnotes
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2. The concept of conjectural variation for price competition has been borrowed from
Jeffrey J. Reimer’s article “Market Conduct in the U.S. Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry”
published in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization (2004, vol:2,
article:9)
3. Following Appelbaum (1982) we also consider that the industry cost function is given
by a generalized Leontief cost function (of the Gorman Polar form)
4. For the above assumptions and approach we closely follow Azzam and Schroeter’s
article “The tradeoff between oligopsony power and cost efficiency in horizontal
consolidation: an example from beef packing” published in American Journal of
Agricultural Economics” (Nov. 1995, Vol: 77, No.:4)
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5. The rental price of capital, and the productivity of capital, labor and processing
materials are 2-digit SIC data for Food & Kindred Products provided electronically
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
46
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for variables used in the empirical estimation
(N = 859, weekly data 1990-2006).
Standard
Variable Symbol MEAN deviation Minimum Maximum
Production of 80% choice steer FQST80 16.10 16.41 0.07 82.89
Production of 65-80% choice steer FQST65 86.38 44.72 9.07 582.88
Production of 35-65% choice steer FQST35 545.20 217.13 6.69 1711.51
Production of 80% choice heifers FQH80 11.57 12.65 0.03 96.53
Production of 65-80% choice heifers FQH65 73.51 36.82 3.62 317.13
Production of 35-65% choice heifers FQH35 415.29 139.64 13.07 1180.29
Farm price of 80% choice steers FPST80 7.37 0.98 0.04 11.27
Farm price of 65-80% choice steer FPST65 7.21 0.99 9.83 11.52
Farm price of 35-65% choice steer FPST35 7.22 0.98 0.40 10.81
Farm price of 80% choice heifers FPH80 7.20 0.97 5.65 11.30
Farm price of 65-80% choice heifers FPH65 7.21 0.99 5.63 10.80
Farm price of 35-65% choice heifers FPH35 7.22 0.99 5.56 18.02
Commercial beef production Q 24.00 1.52 21.09 26.39
Retail price of processed beef P 2.24 0.56 0.87 0.30
Retail price of pork ($/lb) Ppork 2.48 0.25 20.60 28.20
Price of turkey ($/cwt) Pturkey 10.00 0.20 9.70 10.50
Per capita income (thousand $) I 25.16 3.51 17.13 30.51
Consumer price index (84-86 = 100) CPI 171.03 16.38 132.35 201.60
Producer price index (82 = 100) PPI 127.33 18.28 98.40 155.70
Price of No2 diesel ($/gallon) pdiesel 5.27 0.76 4.74 1.09
Price of corn ( $/bus) pcorn 2.34 0.45 1.85 3.60
Price of labor ($/hour) vL 7.75 1.71 4.04 9.94
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for variables used in the empirical estimation
(N = 859, weekly data 1990-2006).
Standard
Variable Symbol MEAN deviation Minimum Maximum
Rental price of capital (2000 = 1) vK 0.70 0.35 0.15 1.31
Productivity of capital (1996=100) Q/XK 101.48 3.15 97.00 110.10
Productivity of workers (1996=100) Q/XL 83.17 15.06 56.60 106.30
Herfindahl index for steer and heifer slaughter H 1952.81 55.46 1661.00 2096.00
Population (millions) POP 281.74 10.52 250.13 299.39
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and standard errors for Quantity Competition.
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
ki% 0.00031 0.00031 55 1.308 0.14
1 -0.422 0.021 56 0.0856 0.0078
11 1.25 0.024 66 0.970 0.0073
12 -0.654 0.0029 #L -7E-07 3.8E-07
13 -0.104 0.0203  #K 5.5E-08 7.7E-08
14 -1.187 0.024 "LL 0.072 0.0064
15 0.235 0.027 "KK 0.0099 0.0046
16 -0.120 0.018 "LK 0.00073 0.002
22 1.209 0.001 0 3.98 0.13
23 -0.142 0.0024 1 0.0015 0.00052
24 0.122 0.021 2 0.044 0.019
25 0.104 0.0023 3 -0.035 0.007
26 -0.091 0.0019 0 3.25 0.072
33 0.456 0.019 1 -0.036 0.014
34 -0.047 0.013 2 -0.067 0.014
35 0.761 0.00065
36 -0.429 0.0007
44 0.734 0.0056
45 0.081 0.000039
46 -0.067 0.00027
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and standard errors for Price Competition.
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
ki! 0.00017 0.00023 55 1.198 0.0214
1 -0.623 0.02 56 0.087 0.0178
11 1.253 0.024 66 1.041 0.0073
12 -0.595 0.0029 #L -4E-07 3.8E-07
13 -0.114 0.0203 #K 5.4E-08 7.7E-08
14 -1.185 0.025 "LL 0.071 0.0054
15 0.225 0.022 "KK 0.0089 0.0046
16 -0.120 0.018 "LK 0.00063 0.002
22 1.209 0.001 0 2.78 0.13
23 -0.140 0.0024 1 0.0025 0.00052
24 -0.126 0.021 2 0.034 0.019
25 0.212 0.0023 3 -0.025 0.07
26 -0.1 0.0019 0 3.15 0.062
33 0.446 0.012 1 -0.035 0.0024
34 -0.05 0.013 2 -0.057 0.014
35 0.761 0.00065
36 -0.422 0.0007
44 0.758 0.0056
45 0.071 0.000039
46 -0.065 0.00027
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Table 4. Market power and cost efficiency effects on output price for two models
of imperfect competition in the U.S. beef Industry, 1990 – 2006 (Quantity
Competition).
Estimate Std. Error
Input 1: 80% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00056 0.000014
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00027 0.000026
Total Effect 0.00029 0.00004
Input 2: 65-80% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00036 2.45E-05 
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00029 0.00002
Total Effect 0.00007 0.00007
Input 3: 35-65% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00069 0.000026
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00043 0.00004
Total Effect 0.00026 0.000018
Input 4: 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.000436 0.000063
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00024 0.00002
Total Effect 0.000196 0.000059
Input 5: 65- 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.000453 0.000043
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00027 0.00005
Total Effect 0.000183 0.00059
Input 6: 35- 65% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.00087 0.000033
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00043 0.00002
Total Effect 0.00044 0.00059
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Table 5. Market power and cost efficiency effects on output price for two models
of imperfect competition in the U.S. beef Industry, 1990 – 2006 (Price
Competition).
Estimate Std. Error
Input 1: 80% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00041 0.00005
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.0003 0.00014
Total Effect 0.00011 0.000059
Input 2: 65-80% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00051 0.000043
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.0003 0.00005
Total Effect 0.00021 0.000059
Input 3: 35-65% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00074 0.00007
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.0004 0.00014
Total Effect 0.00034 0.000053
Input 4: 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.00037 0.000026
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00024 0.00004
Total Effect 0.00013 0.000018
Input 5: 65- 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.000461 1.86E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00028 0.00006
Total Effect 0.000181 0.000016
Input 6: 35- 65% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.00074 4.45E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00043 0.000043
Total Effect 0.00031 0.00002
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Table 6. Market power and cost efficiency effects on input price for two models of
imperfect competition in the U.S. beef Industry, 1990 – 2006 (Quantity Competition). 
 
Estimate Std. Error
Input 1: 80% choice steers
Market power Effect
-0.00005 0.000014
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00027
-0.0003
Total Effect
-0.00032 0.00004
Input 2: 65-80% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00012 2.45E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00029
-0.0003
Total Effect
-0.00017 0.00007
Input 3: 35-65% choice steers
Market power Effect 0.00042 0.000026
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00043
-0.00006
Total Effect
-0.00001 0.000018
Input 4: 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect 0.00007 0.000063
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00024
-0.0003
Total Effect -0.00017 0.000059
Input 5: 65- 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect -0.000453 0.000043
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00027 -0.00027
Total Effect -0.000480 0.00059
Input 6: 35- 65% choice heifers
Market power Effect
-0.00038 0.000033
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00043
-0.0003
Total Effect
-0.00081 0.00059
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Table 7. Market power and cost efficiency effects on input price for two models of
imperfect competition in the U.S. beef Industry, 1990 – 2006 (Price
Competition). 
 
Estimate Std. Error
Input 1: 80% choice steers
Market power Effect
-0.00001 0.00005
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00031
-0.0005
Total Effect
-0.00032 5.90E-05
Input 2: 65-80% choice steers
Market power Effect -0.000015 4.30E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00012 -0.0005
Total Effect -0.000135 0.000059
Input 3: 35-65% choice steers
Market power Effect
-0.00004 0.00007
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00052 -0.0005
Total Effect
-0.00056 5.30E-05
Input 4: 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect
-0.000023 2.60E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00014 -0.0005
Total Effect
-0.000163 1.80E-05
Input 5: 65- 80% choice heifers
Market power Effect
-0.00005 1.86E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00028 -0.0005
Total Effect
-0.00033 1.60E-05
Input 6: 35- 65% choice heifers
Market power Effect
-0.00004 4.45E-05
Cost Efficiency Effect 0.00052
-0.0005
Total Effect -0.00056 0.00002
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Table 8. Simulation Results
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Baseline Case Distortion 0 0
Test Case Projections
Distortion 0.045 0.1136
Changes in welfare
Cournot Bertrand Cournot Bertrand
Consumers surplus(CS) -1.152 -1.087 -5.976 -5.898
Producer's surplus(PS) -0.29 -0.276 -1.761 -1.241
Processor's surplus 1.441 1.363 7.726 7.136
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Table 9. Comparison of market power and cost efficiency effects on output and
input prices.
kiik! >0, kiik% >0
Effect on Output
Price
Market Power
Effect
Cost Efficiency
Effect
Total Price
Effect
Cournot <0 >0 ambiguous
Bertrand >0 >0 >0
Effect on Input Price
Cournot <0 <0 <0
Bertrand <0 <0 <0
kiik! <0, kiik% <0
Effect on Output
Price
Cournot ambiguous >0 ambiguous
Bertrand ambiguous >0 ambiguous
Effect on Input Price
Cournot >0 <0 ambiguous
Bertrand <0 >0 ambiguous
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Figure 1. The trade off between market power and cost efficiency effects of
concentration
Source: Azzam, A.M., and J.R. Schroeter. “The Tradeoff between Oligopsony Power
and Cost Efficiency in Horizontal Consolidation: An example from Beef Packing.”
American Journal Agricultural Economics, 77 (1995): 825-836.
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Appendix 1. SAS Code for Empirical Estimation
DATA SET1;
INFILE SET1;
INPUT YEAR FPST80 FPST65 FPST35 FPH80 FPH65 FPH35
FQST80 FQST65 FQST35 FQH80 FQH65 FQH35 DPST80
DPST65 DPST35 DPH80 DPH65 DPH35 DQST80 DQST65 DQST35 DQH80
DQH65 DQH35 DISINC CPI PPI CORNP PAY PRICAP POP HHIP;
LABEL FQST80 = 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 80% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FQST65= 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 65-80% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FQST35= 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 35-65% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FQH80 = 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 80% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FQH65= 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 65-80% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FQH35= 'DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 35-65% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
FPST80 = 'FARM PRICE OF 80% CHOICE STEERS in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
FPST 65='FARM PRICE OF 65-80% CHOICE STEERS in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
FPST 35 = 'FARM PRICE OF 35-65% STEER CALVES in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
FPH80 =' FARM PRICE OF 80% CHOICE heifers in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
FPH65='FARM PRICE OF 65-80% CHOICE heifers in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
FPH35 ='FARM PRICE OF 35-65% CHOICE heifers in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DPST80=' SUPPLY OF DRESSED 80% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DPST65=' SUPPLY OF DRESSED 65-80% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DPST35=' SUPPLY OF DRESSED 35-65% CHOICE STEERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DPH80=' SUPPLY OF DRESSED 80% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DPH65='DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 80% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DPH35='DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF 80% CHOICE HEIFERS BEEF MIL.LBS'
DQST80= ' PRICE OF PROCESSED 80% STEER in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DQST80=' PRICE PROCESSED OF 65-80% STEER in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DQST80=' PRICE OF PROCESSED 35-65% STEER in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DQST80=' PRICE OF PROCESSED 80% HEIFERS in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DQST80=' PRICE PROCESSED OF 65-80% HEIFERS in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DQST80='PRICE PROCESSED OF 65-35% HEIFERS in CURRENT CENTS/LB'
DISINC= 'DISPOSABLE INCOME PER PERSON IN CURRENT USD'
CPI = 'CPI FOR ALL FOOD 84-86=100'
PPI = 'PPI FOR FARM PRODUCTS,1982=100 (BLS)'
PAY = 'TOTAL INDUSTRY PAYROLL, (NBER_DATA)'
CAPCOST = 'TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL (BILLIONS), NBER_DATA'
PRICAP = 'RENTAL PRICE OF CAPITAL (BLS_DATA), INDEX, 2000=100'
THOURS = 'TOTAL HOURS OF WORK BY ALL PRODUCTION WORKERS,(NBER_DATA)'
POP = 'US POPULATION IN MILLIONS'
CAPPRO = 'Y/K FOR FOOD & KINDRED PRDUCTS 1996=100'
WORKPRO = 'PRODUCTIV. OF WORK-HOURS, FOOD&KIND 1996=100'
TOTDEM= 'TOTAL OUTPUT OF ALL THE BRANDS'
OMEGA='CONJECTURAL VARIATION ELASTICITY FOR QUANTITY COMPETITION'
ALPHA='CONJECTURAL VARIATION ELASTICITY FOR PRICE COMPETITION'
;
RUN;
DATA SET2; SET SET1;
/* THESE INDEXES ARE FROM BLS, FOOD & KINDRED PRODUCTS */;
OUTCAP1=CAPPRO;
OUTWOR1=WORKPRO;
/*CHANGE OF BASE AND DEFLATING THE DATA. THE NEW BASIS YEAR =1987*/;
CPIBASE87=113.5;
CPI87=CPI/CPIBASE87;
PPIBASE87=95.5;
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PPI87=PPI/PPIBASE87;
ICPI=1/CPI87;
IPPI=1/PPI87;
INCOME=DISINC/1000;/*SCALE INCOME TO THOUSAND DOLLARS*/
TOTDEM= DQST80+DQST65+DQST35+DQH80+DQH65+DQH35;
PST80=FPST80/112; /*DIVIDE FARM PRICE BY 112 BECAUSE IT WAS IS IN
$/CWT*/;
PST65=FPST65/112;
PST35=FPST35/112;
PH80=FPH80/112;
PH65=FPH65/112;
PH35=FPH35/112;
PPST80=DPST80/112; /*DIVIDE DRESSED PRICE BY 112 BECAUSE ITWAS IS IN
$/CWT*/;
PPST65=DPST80/112;
PPST35=DPST80/112;
PPH80=DPH80/112;
PPH65=DPH65/112;
PPH80=DPH35/112;
LDQST80=LOG(DQST80);
FQST80=FQST80;
PLAB1=PAY/THOURS; /*PRICE OF WORK/HOUR */
PPORK=PPOR/100;/*DIVIDE POPOR BY 100 BECAUSE ITWAS IS IN CENTS/LB*/;
PTURKEY=PTURK/112;/* $/CWT = $/112 LB */
PDIESEL=PRIDIE/100;/* CONVERT CENTS/GALLON TO $/GALLON*/
/*PUT THE PRICE MATERIALS INDEX IN THE SAME FORMAT (0-1) TO MATCH
PIMAT*/
PCAP=PRICAP/100;
PLAB=PLAB1;
W_Y=1/OUTWOR1; /*THIS VARIABLES WITH A "1" IN FRONT ARE FROM BLS*/
K_Y=1/OUTCAP1;
PROC MEANS;
RUN;
/*PROFIT MAXIMIZATION */
PROC MODEL DATA=SET2;
EXOGENOUS PDIESEL PCORN PPORK PLAB PCAP PTURKEY INCOME HHIP ;
ENDOGENOUS PPST80 DQST80 LDQST80 PST80 PST65 PST35 PH80 PH65 PH35 W_Y
K_Y ;
BOUNDS EFS>0;
/*PRICING EQUATION FOR 80% CHOICE STEERS-PRICE COMPETITION*/
PPST80= (TOTDEM/DQST80*(1+ED))*HHIP*(PST80*(ES80
+(CES8065+ CES8035+ CES80H80+ CES80H65+CES80H35)*ALPHA))
+ED*(( B1*(PLAB*PLAB)**0.5+B2*(PCAP*PCAP)**0.5+ B3*(PLAB*PCAP)**0.5
+ B4*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PLAB+B5*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PCAP)/(1+ED));
/*THE SET OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS */
LDQST80=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E11*(PST80/IPPI)+
E12*(PST65/IPPI)+E13*(PST35/IPPI)+E14*(PH80/IPPI)+
E15*(PH65/IPPI)+ E16*(PH35/IPPI);
LDQST865=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E22*(PST65/IPPI)+
E21*(PST80/IPPI)+E23*(PST35/IPPI)+E24*(PH80/IPPI)+
E25*(PH65/IPPI)+ E26*(PH35/IPPI);
LDQST35=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E33*(PST35/IPPI)+
E31*(PST80/IPPI)+E32*(PST65/IPPI)+E34*(PH80/IPPI)+
E35*(PH65/IPPI)+ E36*(PH35/IPPI);
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LDQH80=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E44*(PH80/IPPI)+
E41*(PST80/IPPI)+E42*(PST65/IPPI)+E43*(PH35/IPPI)+
E45*(PH65/IPPI)+ E46*(PH35/IPPI);
LDQH65=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E55*(PH65/IPPI)+
E51*(PST80/IPPI)+E52*(PST65/IPPI)+E53*(PST35/IPPI)+
E54*(PH80/IPPI)+ E56*(PH35/IPPI);
LDQH35=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)+E66*(PH35/IPPI)+
E61*(PST80/IPPI)+E62*(PST65/IPPI)+E63*(PST35/IPPI)+
E64*(PH80/IPPI)+ E65*(PH65/IPPI);
/*THE SET OF DEMAND EQUATIONS*/
DQST80=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PP
ST80/ICPI));
DQST65=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PP
ST80/ICPI));
DQST35=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PP
ST80/ICPI));
DQH80=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPS
T80/ICPI));
DQH65=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPS
T80/ICPI));
DQH35=EXP(D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPS
T80/ICPI));
W_Y=B1+B4*HHIP*TOTDEM+0.5*B3*(PCAP/PLAB)**0.5;
K_Y=B2+B5*HHIP*TOTDEM+0.5*B3*(PLAB/PCAP)**0.5;
RUN;
FIT DQST80 LDQST80 PPST80 W_Y K_Y M_Y START=(ED=-0.3 D1=0.1 D2=0.2
D3=0.25 ES80=0.15 A1=-0.12
A2=-3 ) /STARTITER PRL=LR N3SLS MAXITER=1000 CONVERGE=0.001 FSRSQ;
INSTRUMENTS _EXOG_ FQST80 PDIESEL PCORN PLAB PCAP;
RUN;
ESTIMATE 'MARKET POWER'(TOTDEM/DQST80*(1+ED))*HHIP*(PST80*(ES80
+(CES8065+ CES8035+ CES80H80+ CES80H65+CES80H35)*ALPHA))
ESTIMATE 'COST EFF' ED*( B1*(PLAB*PLAB)**0.5+B2*(PCAP*PCAP)**0.5+
B3*(PLAB*PCAP)**0.5
+ B4*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PLAB+B5*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PCAP)/(1+ED);
RUN;
PROC MODEL DATA=SET2;
EXOGENOUS PDIESEL PCORN PPORK PLAB PCAP PTURKEY INCOME HHIP ;
ENDOGENOUS PPST80 TOTDEM PST80 PST65 PST35 PH80 PH65 PH35 W_Y K_Y ;
BOUNDS EFS>0;
/*PRICING EQUATION FOR 80% CHOICE STEERS-QUANTITY COMPETITION*/
PPST80= ED*(( B1*(PLAB*PLAB)**0.5+B2*(PCAP*PCAP)**0.5
+ B3*(PLAB*PCAP)**0.5+
B4*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PLAB+B5*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PCAP)/(1+ED))+
H*PST80/ES80 + PST80*OMEGA/CES8065+ PST80*OMEGA/CES8035+
PST80*OMEGA/CES80H80+
PST80*OMEGA/CES80H65+ PST80*OMEGA/CES80H35;
/*THE SET Of SUPPLY EQUATIONS */
DQST80=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
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+E11*(PST80/IPPI)+E12*(PST65/IPPI)+E13*(PST35/IPPI)+E14*(PH80/IPPI)+
E15*(PH65/IPPI)+ E16*(PH35/IPPI);
DQST65=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
+E21*(PST80/IPPI)+E22*(PST65/IPPI)+E23*(PST35/IPPI)+E24*(PH80/IPPI)+
E25*(PH65/IPPI)+ E26*(PH35/IPPI);
DQST35=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
+E31*(PST80/IPPI)+E32*(PST65/IPPI)+E33*(PST35/IPPI)+E34*(PH80/IPPI)+
E35*(PH65/IPPI)+ E36*(PH35/IPPI);
DQH80=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
+E41*(PST80/IPPI)+E42*(PST65/IPPI)+E43*(PST35/IPPI)+E44*(PH80/IPPI)+
E45*(PH65/IPPI)+ E46*(PH35/IPPI);
DQH65=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
+E51*(PST80/IPPI)+E52*(PST65/IPPI)+E53*(PST35/IPPI)+E54*(PH80/IPPI)+
E55*(PH65/IPPI)+ E56*(PH35/IPPI);
DQH35=A0+A1*(PCORN*IPPI)+A2*(PDIESEL*IPPI)
+E61*(PST80/IPPI)+E62*(PST65/IPPI)+E63*(PST35/IPPI)+E64*(PH80/IPPI)+
E65*(PH65/IPPI)+ E66*(PH35/IPPI);
/*THE DEMAND EQUATION*/
DQST80=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80
/ICPI);
DQST65=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80
/ICPI);
DQST35=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80
/ICPI);
DQH80=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80/
ICPI);
DQH65=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80/
ICPI);
DQH35=D0+D1*(PPORK/ICPI)+D2*(INCOME/ICPI)+D3*(PTURKEY/ICPI)+ED*(PPST80/
ICPI);
W_Y=B1+B4*HHIP*TOTDEM+0.5*B3*(PCAP/PLAB)**0.5;
K_Y=B2+B5*HHIP*TOTDEM+0.5*B3*(PLAB/PCAP)**0.5;
RUN;
FIT DQST80 LDQST80 PPST80 W_Y K_Y M_Y START=(ED=-0.3 D1=0.1 D2=0.2
D3=0.25 ES80=0.15 A1=-0.12
A2=-3 ) /STARTITER PRL=LR N3SLS MAXITER=1000 CONVERGE=0.001 FSRSQ;
INSTRUMENTS _EXOG_ FQST80 PDIESEL PCORN PLAB PCAP;
RUN;
ESTIMATE 'MARKET POWER'(TOTDEM/DQST80*(1+ED))*HHIP*(PST80*(ES80
+(CES8065+ CES8035+ CES80H80+ CES80H65+CES80H35)*ALPHA))
ESTIMATE 'COST EFF' ED*( B1*(PLAB*PLAB)**0.5+B2*(PCAP*PCAP)**0.5+
B3*(PLAB*PCAP)**0.5
+ B4*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PLAB+B5*2*HHIP*TOTDEM*PCAP)/(1+ED);
RUN;
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